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Inter-municipal Transit Governance:
An Investigation of Challenges & Opportunities in the Alberta Capital Region

Executive Summary:
This major research paper will examine the possibilities for inter-municipal
coordination of public transit services and regional transit in the Alberta Capital Region.
Through a brief examination of historic inter-municipal conflict, and broader evaluation of
transportation planning literature, this report aims to establish a foundation from which to
analyze potential governance options and future directions. This topic and specific
regional governance options for public transit in the Edmonton region will be evaluated
by reviewing case studies of regional public transit delivery in a Canadian context.
Distinct understanding for these options and future actions will be assessed using
information acquired through interviews with members of the Capital Region Board
transit committee, board members of regional transit committees in Calgary and the Bow
Valley as well as regional transit managers at the Capital Region Board and Calgary
Regional Partnership.
Examining this topic will set the stage to review and analyze the events which
caused the Province of Alberta to create the Capital Region Board in 2008, and the
emerging regional elements of public transit delivery as a key priority in the Edmonton
region. The implications for multi-level governance will be established in the course of
this analysis. Ultimately, this paper should serve to demonstrate that regional problems
require regional solutions; public transit is an inherently metropolitan and regional
service requiring cooperation amongst municipalities and involvement by the provincial
government.

2

Acknowledgement

I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to Dr. Andrew Sancton for his guidance,
assistance and wisdom throughout the process of my Master’s Research Paper.

I am very grateful to all of the willing and enthusiastic interviewees who contributed
greatly to this Master’s Research Paper. Your collective commitment to public service
and interest in public transit are invaluable, and extremely motivating.

My efforts at Western over this past year were made far more enjoyable and contented
by my best friend, Leonard Halladay. Thank you for your patience, your unwavering
support and consistent willingness to indulge me. I love our adventures.

My endeavors are dedicated to my grandparents: four university educated individuals
who lead by example in life-long learning. All of them actively instilled in me the value of
a hard-earned education, and limitless curiosity about the world. Here’s to the journey.

3

Table of Contents

Section

Page(s)

1–

Introduction

4-7

2–

Methodology

8 - 11

3–

Background

12 - 21

4–

Findings

22 - 35

5–

Analysis

36 - 48

6–

Conclusions

49 - 50

Appendix A: List of Interviews & Contacts

51

Bibliography

52 - 55

4

Introduction
Public transportation is a critical public service for contemporary urban dwellers,
and one that services metropolitan regions in many forms. In its very essence, public
transportation as a public good is a basic necessity for the economic and social wellbeing of any city or metropolitan area. Inefficient, ineffective and inadequate access to or
organization of public transit contributes negatively to individual mobility and to the
economic potential of a region; thus, transportation systems require holistic regional
coordination in order to increase livability and maximize the economic potential of a
region. In order to foster meaningful interactions between that region’s inhabitants and
their built, social and economic environments, regional public transportation must
encompass an accessible, reliable network of transportation options. Regional public
transportation infrastructures should provide reasonably swift, seamless access
throughout and within the broader reaches of a metropolitan region. Moreover, regional
services such as public transit should be governed and funded in a manner that affords
the most comprehensive service delivery, cost effective management, and user-friendly
experience as possible to its citizens. Many of Canada’s largest metropolitan areas
practice some form of regional partnership or have a coordinated approach towards their
transportation funding strategies, particularly in regards to public transit. In this context,
and given the relatively integrated functionality of the Edmonton Census Metropolitan
Area (CMA) in other respects, why is there an absence of regionally coordinated public
transit in the region? What factors have contributed to, and perpetuated its absence and
how is this dynamic shifting? Given the mandate of the Capital Region Board to
investigate the potential of regional transit in the Alberta Capital Region, what steps are
being taken to ensure that regional delivery of public transit comes to fruition?
The objectives of this report are twofold: to examine the absence of regional
public transit and to address the best options and next steps toward integrated, inter-
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municipal public transit services in the Alberta Capital Region. The evolution of
institutional structures in the Edmonton region and aspects of multilevel governance
involved in the development of regional public transit policy and delivery are of particular
interest in this research project. Furthermore, a broader literature review in relation to
transportation planning and public transit policy development reveals a number of
themes reflective of the barriers present in the Edmonton region. Barriers that must be
addressed in the course of this research stretch beyond the local and regional
governance issues into some of the distributional barriers that would exist, even if the
Edmonton region were comprised solely of one municipality. Most notably in this context
are issues of urban versus suburban service delivery in public transit. 1
Aside from some employer sponsored (Diversified) and private operators
(Greyhound, SkyShuttle) 2, transit is primarily provided by three publicly owned
operators, which operate public transit through the mayors and councils of the City of
Edmonton, the City of St. Albert and Strathcona County. 3 Furthermore, there are
currently eight municipalities that offer transit services, 4 many of which are delivered by
contracted Edmonton Transit System (ETS) vehicles to smaller outlying communities.
Three additional municipal governments are considering transit services, bringing to
eleven the total potential number of municipalities offering transit service, each with an
independent view of transit service in the Alberta Capital Region. 5 With the exception of
Route 747 to the Edmonton International Airport, Edmonton Transit System does not
operate beyond the City of Edmonton’s boundaries, nor does it currently plan to extend
light rail transit (LRT) services beyond its existing boundaries. Both St. Albert Transit and
Strathcona County Transit systems operate buses within their jurisdictions, and to select
1

John F. Meligrana, “Toward Regional Transportation Governance: A Case Study of Greater Vancouver,” Transportation
26, no. 4 (November 1999): 360.
Capital Region Board, “Inter-municipal Transit Network Plan,” Edmonton: March 2009, 17.
3
Ibid, 19.
4
Capital Region Board. “30 Year Transit Service Plan.” Edmonton: September 2011, 14.
5
Ibid, 14.
2
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destinations in the City of Edmonton. The shortcomings in this arrangement abound, and
derive specifically from overly-complex or inadequate overlap in fare product, scheduling
or transfers. This research focuses specifically upon Capital Region Board transit plans,
and the interaction of ETS, St. Albert Transit (STAT) and Strathcona County Transit
(SCT) in the shift from their present roles toward a more functional and regionally
integrated system.
A more functional system would involve further integration of scheduling,
transfers and fare systems. An ideal system would entail full integration; this could be
achieved through strong, coordinated local leadership through the Capital Region Board
and legislation from the Province. This process could necessitate development of, and
legislation for, a special purpose body, such as a regional commission, tasked with
overseeing public transit delivery in the Alberta Capital Region in a manner similar to
Metrolinx in the Greater Toronto Area or TransLink in Metro Vancouver. This research
should serve to investigate past attempts at integration through annexation, an
examination of Canadian case studies, and potential public transit governance
frameworks currently identified by the Capital Region Board as best suited to deliver
transit services to citizens in the Alberta Capital Region. An effort to establish the best
practices empirically, through analysis of most recent attempts at inter-municipal transit
strategies in the Capital Region, is important to local governments in the Edmonton
region as it strives to manage rapid growth in a sustainable fashion.
In Alberta, like many other regions in Canada, a single, secure revenue stream
for public transit operation and investment does not necessarily exist beyond municipal
budgets. 6 The majority of operational funding for public transit is allocated from fare
recovery (user fees) and municipal property-tax-based budgets, while funding for capital
investment in infrastructure has been fuelled largely by Provincial and Federal
6

Capital Region Board, “Inter-municipal Transit Network Plan,” 95.
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investments, which tend to be sporadic. The province provides ongoing grant funding to
municipalities, of which an approximate $2 billion is dedicated to capital infrastructure 7.
Each municipality is generally able to direct its priorities; for example, “the five cent per
litre fuel tax grant provided to Edmonton and Calgary must be invested in transportation,
but each city determines what type of investment is needed”. 8 Transit is sometimes
eligible for funding through some federal programs, though provinces often direct federal
funding. 9 In this situation, transit as a public good must compete against other essential
public services, such as highways. Although grants from higher levels of government
can be specific, with conditional requirements, 10 investment in transit infrastructure has
been shifting, as transit’s perception as a “green” industry increases. The Alberta
Government announced its Green TRIP (Green Transit Incentives Program) in 2008,
which entails an additional $2 billion 11 (40% for Edmonton, 40% for Calgary and 20% to
other municipalities) dedicated to public transit. Additionally, three recent federal
transfers “specifically oriented toward transit, namely the Public Transit Fund ($400M in
2006), Public Transit Capital Trust 2006 ($900M), and Public Transit Capital Trust 2008
($500M)” have been made in recent years.

7

Canadian Urban Transit Association, “Urban Transit in Canada: Taking Stock of Recent Progress”, 9.
Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 9.
10
John Kim and Douglas S. West, “The Edmonton LRT: An Appropriate Choice?” Canadian Public Policy 17, no. 2 (June
1991): 180.
11
Canadian Urban Transit Association, “Urban Transit in Canada: Taking Stock of Recent Progress”, 9.
8
9

8

Methodology
The purpose of this research paper is to answer the following research
questions: given the relatively integrated functionality of the Edmonton metropolitan
area, why is there an absence of regionally coordinated public transit? What factors
have contributed to, and perpetuated its absence and how is this dynamic shifting?
Given the mandate of the Capital Region Board to investigate the potentiality of regional
transit in the Alberta Capital Region, what steps are being taken to ensure that regional
delivery of public transit comes to fruition?
These research questions emerge from many years of disproportionate and
uncoordinated service levels between municipalities, perpetuated by a political
environment of discordant relations between the City of Edmonton and its most populous
adjacent municipalities. Two key assumptions of this research are entrenched in the
policy goals of coordinated transit service: “that coordination will lead to better outcomes,
and that coordination is a relatively simple endeavor to achieve”. 12 There is a distinct
need to begin to deliver public transportation as a public good and a regional service, in
order to best serve the economic and social requirements of the region. An overarching
element in this research is the relationship between public transit and land-use planning,
as two sides of the same coin. This research will focus on governance, and specifically
upon the interim report on transit governance delivered to the Capital Region Board in
November 2012 and the Capital Region Inter-municipal Transit Network Plan, developed
in March 2009. Although this paper does not directly address the relationship between
land-use planning, transportation planning and public transit, it is important to

12

Marc Schlossberg, “Coordination as a Strategy for Serving the Transportation Disadvantaged,” Public Works
Management and Policy 9, no. 2 (October 2004): 133.
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understand that land-use planning serves to underpin the Capital Region Board’s very
existence.
A strong, historic provincial interest in maintaining the relative status quo of
municipal boundaries has created conflict in the past, exemplified when the City of
Edmonton attempted to expand its municipal boundaries in 1980. A complete
abandonment of regional planning in the 1990’s during Ralph Klein’s premiership further
stalled any potential strategic action or conversation pertaining to regional planning. Only
relatively recently, under Premiers Ed Stelmach and Alison Redford, have contemporary
planning and service delivery issues been mandated onto the agenda of the Capital
Region Board. Hence, when Municipal Affairs Minister Doug Griffiths made clear his
dissatisfaction with the dysfunctional and largely detrimental nature of the status quo, it
became obvious that the provincial role may well be lacking. 13 A closer examination of
the Capital Region Board’s priorities and the broader scope of regional transit in
accordance with recent gestures from the Provincial government indicate that structural
changes may be imminent for regional transit delivery. However the Capital Region
Board, through the Province, must have the legislative authority to take action, and have
the ability to curb the disadvantageous state of regional affairs in the Alberta Capital
Region. It does not currently have such authority.
In order to address these research questions, this research report employs a
qualitative approach of interview and case-study-based investigation. Case studies in
the Canadian context are focused on regional transit governance in the Bow Valley
region of Alberta, Calgary, Vancouver and Toronto. Calgary’s public transit system bears
many similarities to Edmonton’s: both utilize a light rail system, initially constructed for a
major sporting event and both rely upon the same provincial funding structures. Although

13

Elsie Stolte, “Minister urges Capital Region mayors and reeves to work together,” Edmonton Journal, April 11, 2013.
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Calgary has largely avoided the regional conflict experienced in the Alberta Capital
Region, both metropolitan areas number slightly more than a million persons, and are
experiencing similarly high growth rates. Inter-municipal public transit service is in its
infancy in Calgary, yet this region operates within the same legislative and political
frameworks as Edmonton. Moreover, the Calgary region may potentially be subject to
any precedent set through establishment of regional transit in the Edmonton area.
Toronto is a much larger city, with a wider array of transit services and a much
more dense and diverse population than Edmonton. However, the Greater Toronto Area
(GTA) has recently experienced the creation of a regional transit authority in Metrolinx,
an organization created by the Province of Ontario, 14 which has produced a plan to
implement regional transit entitled “The Big Move”. Furthermore, public transit is a
politically active topic in Toronto, and the governance structure of Metrolinx forms one
possible alternative for the Edmonton region to explore. TransLink, which oversees
nearly all transportation planning and infrastructure management, serves the
transportation needs of residents in Canada’s third largest CMA, Metro Vancouver. This
structure is significantly more established in many respects than others in Canada, and
has also been studied academically in some depth, making it a valuable comparator.
Evaluation of TransLink also provides the basis for understanding another alternative
governance structure. Another fascinating, and much smaller case study is that of the
Bow Valley Regional Transit Commission in the Banff-Canmore region of Alberta. This
regional transit partnership has pioneered a precedent for regional transit governance
and integrated municipal transit delivery in Alberta.
Inter-municipal public transportation in the Alberta Capital Region represents a
multifaceted issue for provincial and municipal policymakers: the intersection of land-use

14

Rob MacIsaac, “The Big Move: Transforming Transportation in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area,” Metrolinx (An
Agency of the Government of Ontario), November 2008: vi.
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planning, transportation, and governance. The research design of this report is reflective
of the current political crossroads public transit governance faces in the Alberta Capital
Region. Beyond the comparative politics of a case study approach, used to establish a
spectrum of potential governance options, this report focuses on analysis of Capital
Region Board reports and information gathered directly from interviewing those involved
in the decision making. This approach attempts to capture the relatively current nature of
this topic, and allows for a snap shot of current posturing and prospective action to be
sampled. With the recent announcement of a viability study for inter-municipal transit in
the Alberta Capital Region, and a governance study underway, interviews with decision
makers and e-mail correspondence with those involved have provided much of the
information pertaining to the current status and potential next steps of implementing
inter-municipal transit in the immediate and longer term future. Examination of the
Interim Report on Transit Governance, delivered to the Capital Region Board on
November 17, 2012 by Urban Systems, and the Capital Region Inter-municipal Transit
Network Plan from 2009 have been primary sources of information as the final
governance report and viability study for inter-municipal transit are underway.
Additionally, the Capital Region Board’s Integration Regional Transportation Master Plan
has provided invaluable background. Relevant, recent media coverage has also
provided a basis for examining the political willingness and public perception of intermunicipal transit services across the Alberta Capital Region. Essentially, four primary
information sources were relied upon for the purposes of this research report: interviews
and correspondence with key local decision makers, who are public administrators,
politicians and board members; public reports from the Capital Region Board; literature
pertaining to public transit governance and the specifics of the Alberta Capital Region;
and, to some extent, contemporary media coverage.

12

Background
The municipalities of the Alberta Capital Region have a colourful history, one
marked by rapid post-war growth that continues to this day. According to Statistics
Canada, the City of Edmonton had a population of 812,201 in the 2011 Census, 15
making it the second largest city in Alberta and the fifth largest municipality in Canada. In
regional terms, the population of Edmonton comprises roughly 70% of the total 2011
population within in the Edmonton CMA; this is Canada’s sixth largest CMA, with a
current population is 1,159,869, growing at 11.2% per year. 16 Managing land-use
planning sustainably during times of rapid growth has, at times, been exasperated by
relatively dysfunctional relations between Edmonton and its two largest neighbours, St.
Albert and Strathcona County (Sherwood Park).
Since the early 1980’s, the Edmonton region has had several organizations, with
numerous voting and governance structures, responsible for overseeing regional
development and cooperation. The Edmonton Metropolitan Regional Planning
Commission (EMRPC) came first, 17 followed by the abolition of all regional planning
commissions in 1994 by Alberta’s Klein government both “as an econom[ic] measure
and as a means to promote local economic development”. 18 Continued discordance in
the Alberta Capital Region resulted in the Alberta Capital Region Governance Review in
1998, followed by the creation of the Alberta Capital Region Forum (ACRF). 19
Subsequent creation of the Alberta Capital Region Alliance (ACRA) 20 highlights the
delicate dynamics of the region and their inability to be addressed without collaborative
15

Statistics Canada, “Population and dwelling counts, for Canada, provinces and territories, and census subdivisions
(municipalities), 2011 and 2006 censuses”.
Ibid.
17
Andrew Sancton, Rebecca James and Rick Ramsay, Amalgamation vs. Inter-Municipal Cooperation: Financing Local
and Infrastructure Services (Toronto: ICURR Press, 2000): 17.
18
Ted E. Thomas, “Edmonton: Governance and Planning in the Metropolitan Region,” in Metropolitan Governance
Revisited: American/Canadian Intergovernmental Perspectives, ed. D.N. Rothblatt and A. Sancton, 273-317 (Berkeley:
Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California): 307.
19
Doug Radke, “Working Together: Report of the Capital Region Integrated Growth Management Plan Project Team Final
Report,” Government of Alberta: December, 2007: 10.
20
Edward LeSage and Lorna Stefanick, “New Regionalist Metropolitan Action: The Case of the Alberta Capital Region,”
Canadian Political Science Association Meetings, Winnipeg, 2004: 12.
16
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and proportionate regional governance structures to mitigate conflict. ACRA was
dissolved when the City of Edmonton removed itself in 2006 21 and then pressured the
province for a more effective regional governance model with power to implement
recommendations, resulting in the creation of the Capital Region Board (CRB) in 2008.
Historically, growth in the Alberta Capital Region has been facilitated by through
a systematic absorption, by amalgamation or annexation, of adjacent municipalities by
the City of Edmonton. According to John Gilpin, in his work on early development in the
area, “Edmonton’s first annexation bid was made in 1903 when a city charter was under
discussion; its primary objective was the industrial plants in Cloverdale at the north end
of the river… however, Strathcona annexed this territory before Edmonton could act.” 22
He also notes that Edmonton’s most ambitious bid to achieve these goals was made in
October 1911, an annexation bid which “included the villages of West and North
Edmonton as well as the City of Strathcona.” 23 In 1912, a mere eight years after
Edmonton was incorporated as a City, the newly designated Capital of Alberta
amalgamated with the City of Strathcona, the chosen site of the new University of
Alberta, to the south, across the North Saskatchewan River. Edmonton’s aggressive
annexation policy, combined with the quick action of local politicians to amalgamate
Edmonton and Strathcona, suggest that the objective of these policies was to achieve
the political consolidation of the Edmonton settlement. From 1917 to 1947 there were no
major annexations or amalgamations in the Edmonton region; but from 1947 to 1980
there were nineteen separate annexations, 24 two of the most notable amalgamations,

21

Radke, “Working Together: Report of the Capital Region Integrated Growth Management Plan Project Team Final
Report,” 11.
22
John Gilpin, “The Land Development Process in Edmonton, Alberta, 1881-1917,” in Power and Place: Canadian Urban
Development in the North American Context, ed. Gilbert A. Stelter and Alan F.J. Artibise, 151-172 (Vancouver: University
of British Columbia Press, 1986), 167.
23
Ibid, 167.
24
James Lightbody, “Edmonton,” in City Politics in Canada, ed. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, 255-290
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 276.
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prior to 1979 and 1982 were those of the Towns of Beverly and Jasper Place during the
early 1960’s. 25
Edmonton was (and it some ways, remains) essentially a very small city, even
after the post-war urbanization of the 1950’s. An “Anglo-Ontarian elite dominated social
and civic life until the 1950’s”, 26 and the municipal sphere of politics did not experience a
momentous clash of ideologies until decades later. Edmonton’s politics have been
affected by a broader political environment provincially that is generally quite content
with the status quo. Combine this with “the rapid growth in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and
the lack of comprehensive policy framework on urbanization from the provincial
government”, 27 and it makes sense that Edmonton and Calgary began to expand their
boundaries as quickly as possible. Calgary was, and remains, an incredibly consolidated
census metropolitan area; notably, its outlying communities are fewer in number and
farther away than the relatively large, autonomous bedroom communities lying
immediately on Edmonton’s doorstep. Although the population of the Edmonton region
had increased four-fold between the Second World War and the late 1970’s, and the
metropolitan population now included three sizable municipalities, “both Social Credit
and Progressive Conservative provincial administrations generally turned a blind eye to
difficulties emerging on [Edmonton’s] doorstep”. 28 During this period, both Edmonton
and Calgary were frustrated in their attempts to expand, as there was “no stated policy
on urbanization or local government organization at this time, in general, in Alberta,
there was a consistent unstated policy on community growth and economic
expansion”. 29

25

City of Edmonton, “History of Annexations (map)”,
http://webdocs.edmonton.ca/InfraPlan/SmartChoices/Audit/maps/report1map02.pdf (Accessed November 30, 2012).
Lightbody, “Edmonton,” in City Politics in Canada, 255.
27
Jack Masson, Alberta’s Local Governments and Their Politics (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985), 65.
28
Lightbody, “Edmonton,” in City Politics in Canada, 274.
29
Masson, Alberta’s Local Governments and Their Politics (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1985), 65.
26
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Establishment of district planning commissions in 1950 was a preliminary step in
recognizing and managing services and infrastructure in Alberta’s emergent metropolitan
areas. In 1956, the McNally Commission on metropolitan development recommended
annexation and amalgamation, in large part, and also spoke to broader concepts of
metropolitan development:

1. It is unjust and inequitable that wide variations in the tax base should exist
among the local governing bodies that comprise a metropolitan area where that
area is in fact one economic and social unit.
2. A metropolitan area, which is in fact one economic and social unit, can ordinarily
be more efficiently and effectively governed by one central municipal authority
than by a multiplicity of local governing bodies. 30
Two concepts, specifically rejected by the McNally Commission, were those of a two-tier
federation (Toronto) and government by special purpose districts (Vancouver); the
Commission generally “recommended the amalgamation of Calgary and Edmonton with
their immediately adjacent industrial and residential suburbs.” 31
Both the City of St. Albert and Strathcona County, which border Edmonton to the
northwest and east, respectively, have policies “encouraging a ‘dormitory’ growth rather
than a more balanced variety”. 32 The City of Edmonton and Strathcona County have
fought bitterly over tax-lucrative Refinery Row, a large industrial complex directly to the
east of Edmonton, in Strathcona County. As observed by Bettison, et al., “Sherwood
Park, by remaining an unincorporated hamlet, has retained access to industrial tax
revenues collected by Strathcona County... Though it suffers from limited representation
in local government, the arrangement obviates the financial problem inherent in
dormitory situations generally.” 33 Conversely, St. Albert has attempted to “compensate

30

Jack Masson and Edward C. LeSage, Jr., Alberta’s Local Governments: Politics and Democracy (Edmonton: University
of Alberta Press, 1994), 160.
Lightbody, “Edmonton,” in City Politics in Canada, 276.
32
David G. Bettison, Larrie Taylor and J.K. Kenward, Urban Affairs in Alberta (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,
1975), 254.
33
Ibid, 254.
31
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for its lack of industry by requiring residential development to pay its way by establishing
high assessments… and special charges for the privilege of a noise-free and pollutionfree environment, low social service costs, and similar benefits.” 34 These policies have
been critiqued as being selective, rather than offering a more comprehensive service
package, St. Albert requires a minimum property tax assessment that “tends to set
house prices that exclude low-income families.” 35 The importance of such exclusionary
policies pertains specifically to their implications for other municipalities, which become
obliged to support a disproportionate share of low-income housing and social service
costs, 36 such as public transit for the transport disadvantaged.
The most comprehensive attempt to mediate this situation came in 1979, with an
annexation application submitted to the Local Authorities Board (LAB) by the City of
Edmonton. This was perhaps the largest and most contentious annexation attempt in
Canadian history; the hearing heard 186 witnesses, consumed 106 days of testimony,
witnessed the filing of 299 exhibits and produced 12,235 pages of transcript. 37
Edmonton sought to absorb its metropolitan area as outlined in the McNally
Commission, to encompass St. Albert and Sherwood Park. In December 1980, the LAB
essentially “awarded the City… the area most subject to urbanizing pressures”, 38 and
perhaps most importantly, the Board at this time undertook an update to broaden the
term ‘annexation’, whereby annexation “is viewed as an essential tool in fashioning the
planned development not only of the annexing authority, but the region to which it
contributes in giving a lifestyle.” 39 The City of Edmonton was relying on a
consolodationist approach, recommended by the McNally Commission, and discussed
by Sancton as an approach that dominated in North America in the early twentieth
34

Bettison, Taylor and Kenward, Urban Affairs in Alberta, 255.
Ibid, 255.
36
Ibid, 255.
37
T.J. Plunkett and James Lightbody, “Tribunals, Politics, and the Public Interest: The Edmonton Annexation Case,”
Canadian Public Policy 8, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 207-221, 207.
38
Lightbody, “Edmonton,” in City Politics in Canada, 278.
39
Plunkett and Lightbody, “Tribunals, Politics, and the Public Interest: The Edmonton Annexation Case,” 217.
35
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century, as suburban municipalities voluntarily amalgamated with central cities to
“provide cheaper, better services that could be accessed only by areas that were
included within their boundaries.” 40 However, Lightbody points out that, in Alberta, “the
lieutenant governor in council had the power to vary LAB orders, and, accordingly
Members of Legislative Assembly were bombarded with worried pleas from those about
to lose their municipal identities.” 41 In June 1981, the Alberta Government issued a
revised order, awarding the City of Edmonton some 86,000 acres of land to the
northeast, but not its suburban bedroom communities. In examining the Edmonton
annexation, Feldman suggests in his response to Plunkett & Lightbody that “the political
process won out”, 42 and indeed it did. Regardless, the overarching issue of this case
was “the management of the future growth and development of the Edmonton area”. 43
Fast-forward to the turn of the century; after the Klein government had disbanded
regional planning commissions in Alberta, the Capital Region found itself in disarray, and
a Coordinated Municipal Transit Review was conducted by ACRA in 2002. Among its
conclusions, it recommended that dedicated funding for public transit would be
desirable; it also suggested that transit corridors should reflect potential service growth
beyond the City of Edmonton’s boundaries and reflect the nature of the region’s nonradial travel patterns 44. Most importantly it advised that ACRA assume the role of
regional transit advocate, to “ensure that future growth in the region is supportive of
transit.” 45 The January 2008 “Working Together” report from the Government of Alberta
recommended establishment of the CRB, provision of startup funding, adoption and

40

Andrew Sancton, Merger Mania: The Assault on Local Government, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2000: 37.
Lightbody, “Edmonton,” in City Politics in Canada, 278.
42
Lionel D. Feldman, “Tribunals, Politics, and the Public Interest: The Edmonton Annexation Case: A Response,”
Canadian Public Policy 8, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 367-371, 371.
43
T.J. Plunkett and James Lightbody, “[Tribunals, Politics, and the Public Interest: The Edmonton Annexation Case: A
Response]: A Rebuttal,” Canadian Public Policy 8, no. 3 (Summer 1982): 371-373, 371.
44
Capital Region Board, “Inter-municipal Transit Network Plan,” 11.
45
Ibid, 11.
41
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legislation of its current governance model 46. Upon its establishment, by the Capital
Region Board Regulation, under the Municipal Government Act on April 15, 2008, the
Capital Region Board was mandated by the Province to develop long-term growth plans
for the Alberta Capital Region by March 31, 2009. The CRB met these deadlines, with a
specific regional focus on the intrinsically interrelated concepts 47 of land use planning
and public transit (and regional transportation master planning more broadly). Although
these plans were approved by the Province in 2011, serious concerns remain regarding
the validity of these plans should the Capital Region Board’s provincial funding not be
renewed past 2014. Provincial approval of these plans does not necessarily mean their
recommendations will come to fruition; in fact, past disinterest from the Province
suggests these plans may grow to be insignificant should the Capital Region Board be
unable, or its members unwilling, to proceed in acting as a catalyst to their becoming
reality.
The current mandate of the Capital Region Board is broad, and includes
developing policy for a regional inter-municipal transit network. These include a “30 Year
Transit Service Plan”, an “Integrated Regional Transportation Master Plan”, a “Regional
Transit Cost Sharing Formula Report”, and an interim report on governance framework.
The CRB has delivered these policy and planning documents, which have now been
approved by the Alberta Government. The Inter-municipal Transit Network plan and 30
Year Transit Service plan are the Capital Region Board’s comprehensive roadmap for
the expansion and interconnection of all transit services into one seamless network.
These plans call for the expansion of LRT as the backbone of regional service, intermunicipal bus services, regional park-and-ride facilities and the integration of specialized
transit services. They also include projects to explore integration of transit governance

46
47

Ibid, 10.
Capital Region Board, “Integrated Regional Transportation Master Plan,” Edmonton: September 2011, 15.
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and fare structures across the Capital Region. The concept of integrated fare product
was piloted by the University of Alberta’s U-Pass, a program that simultaneously created
a seamless fare product and lowered fares. In fact, research on frequency and fare
choice in urban transit suggests that “social welfare could be improved by reducing
service frequencies and using the money saved to lower fares” 48 a notion that could very
well see a rise in public transit use, both for discretionary users and the transport
disadvantaged. More importantly, the U-Pass program, and its success, represents the
“most effective example of regional cooperation between the three municipalities”, 49 as a
workable revenue sharing agreement coincided its implementation in September 2007.
Barriers to inter-municipal transit governance in the Alberta Capital Region include
inconsistent and unsecure sources of funding, and the constrained capacity of the
Capital Region Board to make effective decisions in implementing its plans and policies,
thus inhibiting its effectiveness. The CRB was created by the Province, and its funding
through the Government of Alberta is currently secured only until 2014.
Regional governance of transit and delivery of services, specifically, is a topical
political issue in the Alberta Capital Region and becomes especially relevant as the City
of Edmonton expands its LRT system. A new northwest leg of the LRT system is
presently under construction, and could potentially reach St. Albert’s boundaries in the
near future. Additionally, funding has been secured for west and southeast LRT
expansion. These expansions should enable St. Albert Transit (STAT) and Strathcona
County Transit (SCT) to re-evaluate their long term service delivery strategies and
vehicle purchasing plans toward feeder service onto a regional rail network. The LRT is
viewed as a backbone to regional transit service, in the sense that the system would
facilitate inter-municipal commuting; however, interim governance studies suggest that
48
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the LRT would remain within the City of Edmonton’s jurisdiction, with the City leading
expansion. 50 Any potential regional commission would not be responsible for LRT until
this service is expanded past the City of Edmonton’s boundaries. 51
Thus, functional regional transit delivery between these three existing systems
may not require full integration immediately, rather a unitary system of fare product and
timing of transfers at key LRT stations. Once a regional transit governance structure was
established, and management and delivery aspects of regional transit were uploaded,
this could present an appropriate juncture to discuss long-term prospects for the
management and delivery of LRT services. At present, construction of the northwest
LRT means feeder service may be a viable option for St. Albert in the near future, thus
eliminating the immediate need for an integration of bus services with STAT. This
presents a tricky situation, as an eastern expansion of the LRT seems the farthest off
and integrated bus may well be the most viable option for inter-municipal service to and
from Strathcona County. This position in and of itself raises the spectre of conflict, as
each of these three systems operate vehicles which are highly visible, mobile reminders
of municipal autonomy. Therefore, the most plausible formula for successfully
establishing a functional system of regional transit delivery will be found in its
overarching governance structure, with governance and some management aspects
overseen by a regional entity and delivery by municipal operators. Likewise, any
functional regional system must entail willing participation from all three municipal transit
operators, a challenge that remains at the whim of local decision makers and electorate.
Examination of the current policy environment becomes critical to establishing
the feasibility of regional transit service. Recent announcement in February 2013 of

50

Capital Region Board, “Inter-municipal Transit Governance Study and Implementation Plan: Interim Report to the
Transit Committee,” Edmonton: Urban Systems, November 2012: 21.
51
Ibid, 21.

21

voluntary, joint funding 52 for a viability study of inter-municipal regional transit services is
an early victory, and these cooperative efforts were rewarded by additional grant funding
through the Regional Collaboration Program (RCP). 53 The question remains: how can
the Capital Region Board succeed in developing and implementing a functionally
integrated regional transit system without the legislative authority to do so. Are
municipalities expected to cooperate autonomously or will the province take on a greater
role in its metropolitan regions?
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Findings
In considering the tremendous costs associated with public transit delivery, it is
imperative that local governments are attaining the best value for public funds possible,
guided by the most effective service models for citizens. Transit is one of the most
expensive public services currently serviced through property-tax-based municipal
budgets in the Edmonton region; further analysis facilitates high value regional services
that strive to maintain a high quality of life within the region.
Meligrana presents public transportation delivery within a governance and policy
development framework, as “an essential public service in modern society” 54 and as a
“basic and necessary underpinning for the functioning of a city-region”. 55 One of the
most prominent aspects of this work, beyond its governance elements, is its ability to
highlight the integral link between land-use planning and transportation planning that has
become the quintessence of many Capital Region Board reports. Meligrana asserts that
long term sustainability of any metropolitan region is a “reflection of its transportation
system” and, in particular, that when public transit is “inadequate or is organized
ineffectively, personal mobility, economic activity and the environment all suffer.” 56 Some
of the broader themes present in transportation planning literature, and addressed by
Meligrana in relation to the Vancouver case study include those of local versus regional
service, urban versus suburban service and the concept of privatization. The most
instructive aspect of Meligrana’s work for the purposes of this research is his discussion
of models of transportation governance; these five models range from complete
independence to full integration, whereby transit delivery in the Edmonton metropolitan
area is classified at the second stage of integration, as informally coordinated.
Callahan’s assessment of public transit governance in Southern California is useful in
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highlighting the intricacies of American public transit funding models, and the relative
inability of Canadian systems to compare with American and European models.
Superficially, this work serves to illustrate important distinctions between these models
and Canadian examples. Two of Callahan’s four findings on regional transit delivery are
especially relevant to this research: conflict is inevitable and successful regional
solutions are intensely local. 57 Furthermore, Callahan’s examination of three public
agencies revealed that “conflict is endemic and that mechanisms for cooperation are
contextual.” 58
As demonstrated in the background of this report, historic context is of great
importance when considering matters of inter-municipal cooperation in the Alberta
Capital Region. In particular, the dialogue between Plunkett & Lightbody and Feldman
has served to navigate this research through the aggressive attempted annexation of St.
Albert and Sherwood Park by the City of Edmonton, in so much as it captured the
antagonistic and often bitter nature of this dispute within a theoretical framework of
consolidation versus public choice. Additionally, work by Bettison assisted in providing a
detailed picture of the tax policy distinctions between the Alberta Capital Region’s three
largest municipalities, which serve to highlight some of the distributive barriers that
would exist in delivering transit, even if all three of these areas were a part of one
municipality. For example, the concept of a regional fare system is one that would seem
to strike as common-sense approach, perhaps even as a cooperative effort between a
collective of transit operators and certainly for single regional operator. Currently, each
of the inter-municipal transit operations in the Alberta Capital Region charges a “unique
fare that varies from the fare being charged at every other transit operation”. 59 Different
regional fares exist across Canada; for example, residents of the City of Toronto pay a
57
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flat cash fare whether or not they travel three kilometers or thirty, and Metro Vancouver
residents have multiple transit zones with different pricing until the evening rush is over
at 6:30 (after this time the entire system runs of a flat fare). 60 Monthly fares vary by zone
in Vancouver, whereas monthly fares are a flat rate in Toronto; both cities have separate
fare arrangements for commuter rail. Although there is no ideal system for regional
fares, the Alberta Capital Region’s fare systems have evolved perhaps too organically,
to the extent that fares alone have become a deterrent, especially for discretionary and
occasional transit users.
The Universal Transit Pass Program (U-Pass) is popular across Canada, and
has demonstrated the resounding success of an integrated, inter-municipal fare product
for post-secondary students at institutions in the City of Edmonton. This program was
initially negotiated by the University of Alberta Students’ Union with ETS and its two
neighbouring systems; current Edmonton City Councillor Don Iveson, Chair of the CRB
Transit Committee, was part of the team that negotiated the U-Pass on behalf of the
University of Alberta. The U-Pass program has been renewed by large margins in two
student referenda, and has been instrumental in promoting mode shift from automobile
to transit travel to and from campuses. The program provides incentive to shift travel
mode, especially on commuter trips, as this specific U-Pass program is subsidized
through parking revenue and funded through mandatory student fees. Moreover, this
program captures individuals at a moment in their mobility biography when many may
find themselves transport disadvantaged, and simultaneously making many independent
life choices for the first time. The mode shift benefits of this program have been studied
extensively at the University of British Columbia, 61 and are reflective of mode shift
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achieved in many other North American jurisdictions. 62 This provides an excellent
example of the benefits achieved through the development of one single fare product
between the region’s three public transit providers, albeit in an exclusive context and at a
conceptual level.
Issues of service delivery in the Edmonton metropolitan region may appear to
stem quite simply from a lack of inter-municipal cooperation, as the background of this
report suggests. An overview of transit planning and governance literature provides the
grounding in basic principles of transportation and land-use planning which are integral
to this research and analysis. In particular, Meligrana’s analysis of Metro Vancouver’s
evolution in public transit delivery presents a multiple stage model of transportation
governance that provides grounding to place many large Canadian cities in a useful
comparative context in terms of public transit delivery. Meligrana’s historical synopsis of
public transit delivery in Metro Vancouver provided direction through its overview of
transit governance and management across Canada. Specifically, Meligrana’s work was
useful in establishing a spectrum of transit governance in Canada and placing
Edmonton’s current dynamics, and the identified option of a regional commission, within
this spectrum. However, many of the causes of this lacking cooperation are rooted in
lacking and insecure governance frameworks in the Edmonton region, which would
generally be used to address much larger, systemic issues of local concern in Canada:
municipal autonomy, transportation and land use planning, social service efficiency
(such as regional public transit), and tax revenues (through property taxes and transfers
from other levels of government). 63 In many regards, a significant clash of ideologies in
public administration is well illustrated through the Edmonton annexation case and its
implications for planning and service delivery the Alberta Capital Region, especially
62
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services that are such visible signals of municipal autonomy as public transit. The LAB’s
decision of decades past favoured a traditional consolodationist approach, backed by
recommendations from the more antiquated McNally Commission; Peter Lougheed’s
government, however, overturned this decision in order to protect municipal autonomy, a
concept which aligns closely with the fundamentals of public choice theory.
Efforts to coordinate municipal service delivery in the Alberta Capital Region
context can be explored through consolidationist lens of municipal organization, and as
expressed through a frame of public choice. These approaches can be used to assess
decision making at the municipal level through a regional scope, which is the role of
these concepts in relation to regional public transit delivery. Sancton illustrates the
distinction between these two approaches to regional governance succinctly, through his
analogous discussion of grocery store retailing and multi-municipality city-regions. This
compares the level of selection, quality and price citizens receive, as taxpayers, in both
administration and services, as akin to a monopolistic provider of services versus a
wider array of choices in municipal service provision. 64 Trepidation for a consolodationist
model could potentially arise if citizens are exclusively conceptualized as consumers of
municipal services, rather than an intricate and engaged element within the fabric of the
public administration process.
In terms of public transit and public choice, municipalities can cooperate across
jurisdictions to provide more comprehensive services, decrease their scope of
comprehensive service delivery in favour of more select service provision, or an increase
in management of contracted services. However, Sancton illustrates that few people
shop for an overall municipal service package, and that the majority of citizens are likely
to be disinclined, or incapable, of moving from municipality to municipality simply based
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on their perceived need of municipal services. 65 This notion is reminiscent of the relation
between residential relocation and the concept of an individual’s mobility biography; in
short, an individual’s built environment exercises a distinct influence over their preferred
mode of travel at major moments in one’s life, however not everyone perceives the real
impacts of the built environment on their transport habits. 66 Thus, a vast discrepancy in
regional public transit services is detrimental in the a broader theoretical context, if one
considers that regional public transit in a metropolitan area to be a public good, designed
to encourage social mobility, economic prosperity, and environmental stewardship for all.
Further, Sancton’s analysis of public choice demonstrates that the efficient
delivery of municipal services need not require large municipalities. 67 This is not to say
that the transit needs of a city-region are best served by one large municipality, but
rather through some form of deliberate, coordinated service delivery. Variety in the size
and type of municipalities within a region may generate a multitude of service models,
although this situation does not, in and of itself, result in inefficiencies. Thus, there is little
incentive to assume that Edmonton’s failed annexation, or any future amalgamation in
the Alberta Capital Region is a wise strategy to pursue under the guise of perceived cost
savings, or service efficiencies. Edmonton is, however, stuck in an awkward position as
a relatively consolidated region in comparison to Metro Vancouver, but a region far less
consolidated than Calgary, for example. A more detailed examination of Edmonton’s
struggle as an outlier on this scale of regional population distribution creates a distinct
challenge in delivery of public transit. While the region cooperates on essential services,
such as waste management and sewage treatment, these underground services are
almost universally regarded as essential, and are often “out of sight, out of mind” for
many citizens. Contrariwise, public transit vehicles are roving, visible signals of
65
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municipal autonomy, and can be perceived as an especially expensive and subsidized
public service that can be tailored to an individual community’s need. Thus, Edmonton
and its two large suburban bedroom communities make up the overwhelming majority of
the Edmonton CMA’s population, but have largely represented their own interests in a
manner that has discouraged inter-municipal cooperation, except on the most
straightforward of issues. Enter the CRB as a regional entity, and its provincially decided
mandate for longer-term, more visionary approaches to planning and service delivery in
the Alberta Capital Region.
The forum for inter-municipal interaction and the political context of multilevel
governance are paramount when considering regional public transit in the Edmonton
metropolitan area. Two prominent Albertan academics, LeSage and Stefanick, note the
importance of multilevel governance in the Alberta Capital Region, and provide the basis
for understanding services such as inter-municipal transit within this sphere. LeSage and
Stefanick’s findings are related to the theory that, in a globalizing world, regional rather
than national governments have the best ability to capitalize on emerging economies
and political power. 68 This concept speaks to the importance of regional local
government collaboration in addressing barriers and pursuing opportunities for intermunicipal transit. The history of regional cooperation and planning in the Edmonton
area, and the inherent “municipal polycentricity” 69 of the Edmonton metropolitan region
has produced a region that cooperates effectively in some respects, such as utilities
servicing and waste management, 70 yet lacks coordination of transit delivery. When
Lightbody asserts that “Calgary is essentially unitary; Edmonton is not”; 71 he advocates
that the most cost effective way to deliver services, and essentially to govern the
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Edmonton region, is through municipal consolidation. Sancton et al. note “municipal
organization in Edmonton is already remarkably consolidated”, 72 with around 70% of the
CMA population in relation to Calgary’s 95% share of the CMA population. In
considering governance frameworks at a local level, we must consider the potential
consolidation advocated by Lightbody, and the existing relative consolidation in
Edmonton, argued by Sancton. In the context of transit as a public good, both may prove
ineffective, as citizens of the Alberta Capital Region experience disproportionate service
delivery as a result of poorly regional coordinated transit. In their discussion of multilevel
governance in the Calgary context, Miller and Smart explain that, no matter the relative
consolidation of a region’s population, relations between municipal, provincial and
federal governments in Canada could “better be seen as a complex mosaic of bilateral
relations that occasionally expand into trilateral programs or conflicts”. 73 Furthermore,
amalgamation of multiple existing municipalities to create larger regional government, in
the hopes of lowering overall service and administration costs can create distinctly
separate issues of representation and urban policy development. Such is the case with
the Halifax Regional Municipality, a massive geographic region comprised largely of
rural areas with “70 percent of the population crowded into 5 percent of the municipality
near Halifax harbour.” 74 Thus, Finbow asserts that “amalgamation essentially submerged
urban areas in an oversized, rural-based entity that is unable to effectively advocate for
urban interests.” 75 The situation in the Halifax Regional Municipality represents an
interesting case whereby amalgamation as a solution to regional service distribution has
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ultimately led to political and social fragmentation between urban and rural residents,
within a broader municipality unable to represent either set of interests.
Examination of Canadian case studies of regional transit planning, specifically,
provide instrumental awareness of functioning models of regional public transit
governance, within comparable funding arrangements and relatively analogous policy
environments. Vancouver, as a highly fragmented metropolitan area, and Calgary, the
model of consolidation, present reasonable context to place the Alberta Capital Region
as an outlier of relative consolidation; there are three large municipalities in the Alberta
Capital Region, and a highly fragmented approach to cooperation on services, based
largely upon type of service. The Greater Vancouver Regional District (now Metro
Vancouver) encompasses twenty municipalities, 76 many of them sizable enough to rival
the City of Vancouver proper for dominance, population wise. This makes the Metro
Vancouver area a relatively fragmented city-region, 77 yet one that is able to cooperate
effectively on issues of public transportation and transportation planning through
mandated regional governance of these issues. Metro Vancouver is served by
TransLink, a uniquely adaptive organization, a branch of BC Transit that was
strategically developed specifically to serve Metro Vancouver, and designed to respond
to a particular set of circumstances. 78 TransLink has subsequently evolved, since its
inception in 1999, 79 to oversee most major transportation infrastructure across the
multitude of municipal boundaries in Metro Vancouver. What is significant is the
comprehensive nature of this organization, and the success in regional strategic
planning achieved by TransLink, as a result of Provincial involvement. TransLink has
engaged in extensive strategic planning, that resulted in major changes in 2007 which
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included new revenue-generating measures, a restructuring of the executive of the body,
and increases in the areas under TransLink's jurisdiction. 80
While interviews reveal that regional transit planning is truly in its infancy in
Calgary, the C-Train and Edmonton’s LRT system bear much in common in terms of
system development and the built environments they support. Calgary and Edmonton
may be long-time rivals, but these two cities are natural comparators: they are of
relatively similar size and located within the same provincial policy environment.
Whereas a regional conversation on service sharing and inter-municipal services has
been ongoing in the Alberta Capital Region over the past forty years, inter-municipal
transit service is a relatively new issue in the Calgary region. The apparent result is that
provincial structures for regional planning in British Columbia have allowed the
fragmented municipalities of Metro Vancouver to coincide in relative peace within a
metropolitan area nearly twice the size of Alberta’s metropolitan areas around Edmonton
and Calgary. In particular, the Alberta Capital Region has become a highly charged
political battleground, with three large municipalities vying for the interests of their
residents, with little in the form of provincial oversight, beyond the Capital Region Board.
While the municipalities in the Alberta Capital Region, and especially the City of
Edmonton, attempts to fandangle agreements and arrangements that best serve the
region’s citizens, municipal consolidation in Calgary largely obviates these issues and
perpetuates reluctance on the part of the provincial government in Alberta to intervene in
a manner that would implement serious change in the Alberta Capital Region.
Metrolinx, in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), serves as another example of
regional transit governance. Metrolinx is an agency of Ontario’s provincial government,
created to improve the coordination and integration of all modes of transportation in the
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Greater Toronto Area. 81 This entails a regional governance model of many municipalities
and transit operators, including the GO Train system, cooperating together. These
examples do serve useful, although any successful endeavor toward a regional transit
commission in the Alberta Capital Region must remain conscious of budgetary
provisions, and stable secure funding for transit remains a key issue across Canada,
and particularly in Alberta, as “provincial plans in Canada still evolve in splendid
isolation”. 82 Such a model could be applied to the Edmonton Metropolitan region,
although one glaring difference in service delivery to citizens between the Capital Region
and the Metro Vancouver or the GTA, is the disparity of service levels in public transit;
the Edmonton region has multiple public transit providers and an intricate system,
whereas the Province of British Columbia mandated “the South Coast British Columbia
Transportation Authority… commonly known as TransLink” 83 to serve Metro Vancouver,
likewise Metrolinx is provincially mandated to serve the GTA. 84 Public transit, and
transportation networks in general, are an excellent example of how metropolitan
regions are “an integrated and interwoven unit; autonomous communities thus fragment
government activities that are regional by nature.” 85 Certainly if the Edmonton region
integrated transit services to some degree with St. Albert and Strathcona County, this
more cohesive service could “offer more attractive and convenient transit routing,
scheduling and service; more destinations could be serviced… in the core area, saving
travel time, and transfer inconvenience.” 86
From a planning perspective, the Edmonton region may not even be the most
suitable in terms of being high density or possessing strong socioeconomic indicators
favoring mass transit use. In particular, there is a strong relation between the success of
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an urban rail network and its supporting policies and structures. However, its suitability
to an urban rail network need not impede such a system’s success should careful use of
suitable policy be employed, 87 in fact, some of the most successful urban rail systems in
North America include nearby Vancouver’s SkyTrain and Calgary’s C-Train. 88 Realistic
assessment of service delivery and regional growth strategies should acknowledge that
“modal choice in personal transportation is a complex phenomenon”, 89 and that delivery
of the best quality services throughout the region will require forward thinking strategies
and policy implementation. One of the most effective mechanisms for addressing intermunicipal transit is to address economies of scale within a city-region, as supported
through research on commuting in the Canadian Prairie cities. That is to say, no matter
the scale of development, if public transit is supposed to increase social mobility, reduce
the economic strains of commuting, and mitigate the ramifications of urban sprawl that
as population density increases, “both urban and rural areas exhibit shorter commute
distances”. 90 This research demonstrates that population density, and land-use planning,
are intrinsically connected to transportation systems, yet the interesting element of this
connection is that population density need not increase systematically, in every region,
for its positive ramifications to effect a metropolitan region in its entirety.
An interesting precedent has been set in Alberta, in the form of a small transit
commission that provides inter-municipal transit services in the shadow of the Rocky
Mountains. The Town of Banff, the Town of Canmore and Improvement District #9
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on January 7, 2009 91 declaring their
commitment to establishing a regional transit commission. These three municipalities
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passed by-laws approving draft business plans for the commission, and submitted the
plan to Alberta’s Ministry of Municipal Affairs in April of 2010. 92 Thus, the Bow Valley
Regional Transit Commission (BVRTC) was established in 2011 and began providing
regional service in 2012; 93 currently its small fleet provides services between the Town
of Canmore and the Town of Banff, with the permission of Parks Canada. The Towns of
Banff and Canmore share the costs of operation equally 94 and the commission is moving
forward with a five-year business plan to incorporate services to local ski resorts and
other popular recreational destinations in the area, such as Lake Louise. Stakeholders
involved at other levels of government have included Parks Canada; additionally, many
private sector industries such as resorts and hotels have expressed an interest in being
involved with the BVRTC. This commission and its inter-municipal service have set a
precedent, albeit on a much smaller scale than the Alberta Capital Region is operating.
As illustrated through the feasibility study of regional transit, currently underway
in the Alberta Capital Region, collaborative attempts toward realizing economies of
scale, efficiencies in service and resource allocation for joint capital projects can be
rewarded by the Government of Alberta through Regional Collaboration Program (RCP).
Not only does such cooperation generate greater resources in terms of funding, it yields
a much higher potentiality for tangible results 95 that increase the service quality of transit
in the Alberta Capital Region, and perceived quality of life from a region’s citizenry.
Through the BVRTC, the initial stages of regional planning and inter-municipal service
development have been undertaken by three Alberta municipalities and thus set a
precedent for regional transit governance. Moreover, Provincial Green Trip capital
funding for capital projects and political championship from Alberta’s big city mayors
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have put regional public transit on the agenda in the Alberta Capital Region. Such
factors have assisted in bringing regional public transit to the mandate of the Capital
Region Board, and have been highlighted in land-use documents through the concept
that no bus route or transit service should be an island: “each bus route acquires added
value insofar as it is part of a transit system potentially allowing transfers”. 96
The CRB, specifically, is a vehicle to establishing regional public transit services
in the Alberta Capital Region, “through legislation and regulation, [the CRB] been
mandated to develop the Capital Region Growth Plan, but has not explicitly been
charged with its implementation”, 97 and thus implementation ultimately becomes a
decision made by the three operators of public transit in the region. Hence, a viability
study, as announced in February 2013, is now underway to examine the next moves for
these three municipal operators. Given the high degree of investment made by the
region’s three transit operating municipalities, any shift toward a regional system
presents a complex political and economic decision. One major incentive, presented in
correspondence with the CRB, is the concept of a regional transit commission as an
advocate for funding, and further as a regional organization that may garner increased
access to funding that each municipality operating on its own. The feasibility study will
present options for proceeding with regional transit that could ultimately translate into a
business plan that could be presented to individual councils and to the Province.
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Analysis
The first legs of Edmonton’s LRT system began operation in time for the 1978
Commonwealth Games, when Edmonton was the first municipality in North America with
a population of less than a million persons to operate a system of this kind. Edmonton
recognized early on that “integrated, high-quality, and accessible transit systems are
essential in order to attract travelers to shift to public transport”. 98 Only a few years ago,
Edmonton Transit System (ETS) was the first in Canada to claim a fully accessible
transit fleet and network of facilities; in light of recent investments and promotion, LRT
has recently undergone a massive resurgence in ridership. Evaluation of governance
options, and subsequent policy implications, presently undertaken by the Capital Region
Board are at a critical intersection, in an attempt to make feasible some type of regional
public transit framework. The relevance and importance of multilevel governance to
regional public transit policy, specifically the pertinence of the Provincial government in
this context, underscore the need for some measure of intergovernmental relations in
the context of mass transit. 99 Governance of public transit involves numerous
organizations, and interactions between levels of government, which can lead to a
fragmented steering approach. 100 A regional public transit governance framework would
generate an overarching aim and accountability structures to provide sensible,
comprehensive services within the Edmonton region in a manner that avoids duplication
of services and encourages more creative land use policy, rather than having Edmonton
and its outlying communities continuing to grow boundlessly.
In Horak’s analysis of multilevel governance in Canada’s municipalities, he
concludes that there are many “complex files” which require “specifically multilevel
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action”, 101 Horak notes that such action is necessitated by a lack of capacity at the local
level, and a level of policy response catered to local conditions that demands local
involvement, but may involve action from higher orders of government. 102 Horak
identifies four primary agents involved in multilevel governance, and four primary roles
for these actors. These agents are identified as local government, provincial
government, federal government and local social forces; 103 these agents may be
involved in multilevel governance in one or more of the following aspects: policy
advocacy, resource provision, policy development and policy implementation. 104 Horak
suggests that Canadian cities have too many “complex files” and policy issues for one
level of government to address alone, thus multilevel governance should not be avoided
as a mode of policy making. 105 In the specific case of multilevel governance and intermunicipal transit in the Alberta Capital Region, indeed a “complex case”, the main
agents are local and provincial governments, with a small degree of federal involvement
in regards to capital funding for large-scale investments. The CRB, specifically, is
designed to bridge the role between local and provincial agents and is mandated to
foster regional cooperation; however, the CRB does not have the power necessary in
terms of resource provision or policy implementation to be effective. While the CRB
operates in the spheres of policy advocacy and policy development, it cannot be
successful as a bridge between agents should it be unable to become more involved in
multilevel governance within all four of the above aspects.
Horak defines the idea of multilevel governance as “a mode of policy making that
involves complex interactions among multiple levels of governments and social
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forces”, 106 and certainly public transit fits as a complex policy issue within this frame.
Indeed, Minister Griffiths’ comments allude to aspects of multilevel governance present
in the sphere of financing and operating inter-municipal public transit in the Alberta
Capital Region. In terms of regional planning and multilevel government interaction,
between local agents and their provincial agent, the “Working Together” report, the plan
that resulted in creation of the CRB, provides insight as toward the gaps in the CRB’s
authority and jurisdiction. While LRT in particular is identified explicitly as a specifically
regional issue, 107 there is a distinct gap in the CRB’s legitimacy between two key stages:
detailed planning and decision making, whereby the CRB has no authoritative powers in
recommending plans. 108 This report agreed with the City of Edmonton’s position as a
dominant local agent, and attempted to create a voting structure reflective of this
dynamic; moreover, the report recognized that complete “local authority and autonomy
at all costs is inappropriate for the good of the entire region, [and that] local
circumstances deserve recognition in the decision-making process.” 109 However, the
report that led to the creation of the CRB also leaves a distinctly grey area, and does not
address the awkward dynamic of the Alberta Capital Region as a mostly consolidated
but still distinctly fragmented city-region; the report claimed that “the transfer of most
planning and decision-making responsibility to the Province, including decisions that will
affect the City of Edmonton, implies that the City does not believe that working with its
regional partners, in the absence of provincial direction, will lead to effective
decisions.” 110 The report argues that the Province is not necessarily in a better position
to “make local decisions than locally elected officials, which seems unsupportable given
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the philosophy of the Municipal Government Act.” 111 This report takes a somewhat
threatening tone, when it states that the current voting model of the CRB presumes that
Edmonton will not act on its own and thus “jeopardize its opportunity for a truly regional
partnership” because, “if this model is not successful, the alternative is long and
protracted debates on options that include annexation or amalgamation”. 112 Even taking
the most positive approach to this situations entails that all solutions to regional
problems in the Alberta Capital Region will be born out of a consensus model; this is,
quite simply, an unrealistic expectation. The realities of regional service delivery are
based in the region’s finances, whereby industrial revenues flow primarily to two
counties 113 and where cost sharing is largely based on population distribution and not
tax assessments. 114 The CRB is tasked with providing policy, and is mandated to be a
leader, yet has little in the way of management authority or any design or influence in a
coordinated implementation attempt of its policies. The CRB must evolve, through
legislation, toward having the ability to manage and implement change.
Where planning for public transit in the Alberta Capital Region is concerned, the
Capital Region Board defines inter-municipal public transit within its ambitious 30 Year
Transit Service Plan as including the following comprehensive services and facilities: 115
•
•
•
•
•

All light rail transit capital and operating costs including operations and facilities
entirely within a single jurisdiction (assuming LRT remains in Edmonton)
All bus services operating from the last transit center or stop in one jurisdiction
across municipal boundaries to stops located in another jurisdiction
A proportionate cost of all facilities required to support operation of transit
vehicles needed to operate inter-municipal bus and rail services including
garages
‘Park and Ride’ lots and transit centers primarily required to support the intermunicipal flow of passengers by transit, car pool or van pool
Transit priority corridors that facilitate the movement of buses or rail vehicles on
corridors that are used by inter-municipal transit vehicles
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•

Regional initiatives that facilitate regional transit including but not limited to
information services, smart buses, smart cards, or a regional control center

This definition forms the basis for critical analysis of governance issues and
discussion of governance frameworks for inter-municipal transit from CRB documents.
For example, within the Capital Region Inter-municipal Transit Network Plan, several key
principles are established: that functional responsibility must be distributed along a
continuum, and that these responsibilities will evolve over time, and that the CRB must
focus on ‘quick wins’. 116 The first two of these three principles coincide with one another
and are understandable, given the degree to which integration must occur between three
operators that are informally coordinated, 117 to use Meligrana’s scale of integration.
These principles also signal a more pragmatic and visionary approach to public transit
delivery and inter-municipal services in the Alberta Capital Region generally. However,
the ‘quick win’ approach is somewhat troublesome. While this approach is often viewed
as an effective method of championing a cause through relatively immediate and visible
successes, this specific method may not serve the CRB Transit Committee or the
Alberta Capital Region well in the long term. In fact, the Alberta Capital Region
Governance Review was critical of ‘quick win’ concept over ten years ago. This
approach, in a 2009 context, was understandably identified as a manner of delivering
tangible results that could be attained by using immediately available GREEN Trip
funding 118. However, the ‘quick win’ mentality is also cited as being a strategy that could
provide any new regional entity with “significant credibility”. 119 While this tactic was
initially conceived to generate swift action in light of GREEN Trip funding from the
Province of Alberta, its mentality becomes infectious and begins to negate the very
purpose of these reports as a significant step toward regional service delivery, one that
116
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must acknowledge such changes will present challenges and generate some conflict.
For instance, establishment of a regional fare system and purchasing of new buses are
not ‘quick wins’, 120 these are major milestones that must be regarded as such.
Should the Capital Region Board be unable, or its members unwilling, to deliver a
concrete and workable solution for management of regional land-use and service
delivery, the Province has considered amalgamation within the region. 121 Amalgamation
remains an unlikely and relatively drastic course of action; however, a more relevant
consideration is that regional provision of services should not necessitate amalgamation.
While some degree of Provincial action is likely necessary to expedite implementation of
regional transit, and has taken place elsewhere in Canada, it would be prudent to recall
successes. For example, the U-PASS demonstrates a situation whereby municipalities
and organizations within the Alberta Capital Region were able to cooperate on their own
accord to afford residents a glimpse at the ease of inter-municipal transit fare. In the
context of CRB endeavours and inter-municipal transit for a broader population in the
Alberta Capital Region, interviews with CRB Transit Committee members revealed that,
at present, there is a strong degree of political will in the region to realize some degree
of regional and inter-municipal public transit service. One interviewee specifically
mentioned the confusion for residents that arises from a plethora of fare products among
three operators, since there are over one hundred different fare products and options
throughout the Alberta Capital Region. These include fare products available on
Edmonton Transit, St. Albert Transit and Strathcona County Transit and those fare
products available for travel on other services, such as contract service provided by
ETS. If the ultimate goal of a public transit system, in fundamental competition with the
private automobile, is to provide even effective commuter services within a metropolitan
120
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region, any added complexity of fare structure will only serve to provide a significant
barrier to generating the necessary mode shift in discretionary ridership. Moreover, the
key demographic for success of any regional system lies in generating mode shift from
discretionary riders versus the transport disadvantaged (those who use transit due to
social constraints). 122 That is to say transit ridership is already high amongst students,
seniors and those unable to afford consistent travel in a private automobile; 123
successful regional transit relies upon those with discretionary, disposable income for
travel to choose transit over the private automobile, for a least some portion of their daily
trips.
The concept of mode shift entails the following challenges, as identified by
Harris: that transit faces fundamental technological competition from the automobile; that
transit invariably tends to lose money (increasingly so as the city becomes more
sprawling); and, that “the benefits of high frequency, loss-making transit services tend to
be captured by land owners, insofar as transit allows higher densities of development
than automobile-only access.” 124 This is to say that transit not only generates, but relies
upon higher density development and presents the case for public transit planning and
land-use planning as intrinsically interrelated concepts. In municipal settings in Canada,
where property-tax based budgets make up a majority of municipal budgets, higher land
values can be achieved with higher densities and thus, improve access to public transit.
Conversely, it is imperative that developers and property owners alike feel confident that
increased transit services be delivered should they choose to build and inhabit higher
density dwellings. This conversation is topical in nearly all Canadian metropolitan areas,
and the paradigm in the Alberta Capital Region is well summarized in Staples’ recent
article in the Edmonton Journal where he notes that Alberta Minister of Urban Affairs
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Doug Griffiths “spoke out in favour of smarter growth at the Capital Region Board last
week, and Edmonton’s commitment to ‘grow up’ as a struggle when municipalities
building outwards are right on your borders.” 125
In addition to tying land-use planning and transit together more cohesively, there
are significant challenges associated with developing any type of regional governance
structure for public transit in the Alberta Capital Region, that are far beyond a ‘quick win’.
Among the key issues and next steps as identified in the Interim Report on transit
governance, many fiscal issues arise. This report suggests that the ability of local
governments to generate revenue to expand and operate transit are constrained, 126 and
notes a lack of sharing arrangements between any of the transit providers in the Alberta
Capital Region, either for capital projects or ongoing operational costs. Moreover, the
CRB and the Transit Committee do not have direct access to direct, stable and
sustainable sources of funding; 127 in addition, many of the mechanisms for funding
transit that are available in other provinces such as British Columbia and Ontario are
currently not feasible in Alberta unless legislation to enact a new form of revenue or
taxation were developed. 128 Capacity for funding development and operation
coordinated inter-municipal transit exists within a complex overall structure for transit
funding in Canada. In particular, a lack of dedicated operational funding for transit in
Alberta hinders any potential regional service. These issues are at the forefront of
regional inability, especially on the part of the CRB, to manage or implement any
effective change to the status quo. Ironically, the CRB as a regional entity presents a
chance for the region’s municipalities to act as a regional funding advocate for a
conglomeration of transit providers, both at the provincial and federal levels, in a manner
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that may serve the region far more effectively that a handful of operators advocating
independently.
Beyond the conundrum of transit funding, decision making by the Transit
Committee and the CRB as a whole are constrained through a veto system by any of the
three transit operators, 129 a dynamic that was reflected in speaking with some decision
makers; the CRB has no leverage or power to enact a regional commission or any other
governance structure whereby all three transit operating municipalities take part. Thus,
governance must evolve incrementally in iterations whereby Legislative adjustments
may be able to keep pace as required in order to direct the CRB’s mandate into the
future. In terms of land-use planning and public transit planning agendas especially,
these adjustments may also “involve the Municipal Government Act which currently
governs the responsibilities and powers of municipalities in Alberta.” 130 These changes
could be overseeing implementation or acting in a “highly prescribed manner”, 131
however the final recommendations of the CRB Inter-municipal Transit Network Plan do
not blatantly suggest any specific way to proceed, only that the Province support
governance in the form of a Regional Transit Committee (RTC) and enact “any
necessary legislation and/or regulatory changes to support the implementation of this
governance model”. 132
Based on the CRB’s 30 Year Transit Service Plan, and its definitions of intermunicipal transit, the ‘quick win’ approach would seem to be a losing strategy for gaining
long term momentum. While an early victory may draw attention to regional transit, this
approach will likely only serve as a detriment to the cause of inter-municipal transit in the
long run. First, this approach may present a somewhat substantial, immediate result that
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provides instant gratification to policy makers and politicians without realizing any
effective, long-term change. Secondly, this approach mitigates the very concept that
sweeping, structural changes are required to make public transit a service that is
effectively managed and delivered in the long-term. Beyond discussion of regional LRT,
a ‘quick win’ approach will not suffice in bringing together ETS, STAT and SCT to
develop a governance structure whereby they deliver service in a coordinated manner,
even at the most autonomous level whereby the three operators are governed and
managed by a regional entity while maintaining autonomy over delivery of service. This
said, some of the ‘quick wins’ presented in the CRB’s Inter-municipal Transit Network
Plan are more directed, including recommendation for an urban transit section at Alberta
Transportation 133, which would establish a meaningful place for a dialogue on public
transit. Another important suggestion was to create a place for public transit in the
broader context of other public policy issues such as public health and environmental
stewardship.
While these are respectable concepts, one issue that has yet to be addressed by
the CRB is that of knowledge management, and its own lack of expertise in urban transit
issues and transportation management; existing knowledge in the Alberta Capital
Region is currently siphoned within departments of ETS, STAT and SCT. This signals
that a coordination of local agents is critical 134 prior to proceeding at the Transit
Committee level of the CRB; further, an absence of staff and knowledge at the CRB
level is reflective of a limited capacity for dealing with urban transit issues at Alberta
Transportation. 135 The current design of provincial grants, such as GREEN Trip, and
other similar capital funding sources must be reflective of a regional transit system and
not three separate operators, while some funding does address inter-municipal transit it
133
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does not truly build a regional transit system. 136 The current system of one-to-one
bilateral agreements would need to be merged incrementally and upgraded to a regional
scale in order to access the funding required to make regional transit successful.
Consequently, the responsibilities of any special purpose body tasked with management
of transit in the Alberta Capital Region would likely play a governance and management
role, while service delivery and implementation would continue to be the responsibility of
three separate operators; paramount in any arrangement for regional transit governance
is the “legislated authority to access various sources of funding.” 137 This situation is
somewhat reminiscent of Metrolinx, with ten local transit operators 138 conceptually
coordinated through a provincially mandated organization. Alternatives to the Transit
Committee structure within the CRB are explored at length in the Interim Report of the
Inter-Municipal Transit Governance Study and Implementation Plan, delivered to the
CRB in November 2012. This report suggests that it would be prudent for the Transit
Committee, the CRB and the Province to work collaboratively through any governance
discussion in order to establish any required legislative authorities, 139 a step that has yet
to be taken beyond a discussion amongst local operators and municipal agents. Among
the governance frameworks discussed in the Interim Report are: a regional commission
model, an inter-municipal partnership model, a controlled corporation model, and a nonprofit corporation model. Both corporate models have been dismissed, and while the
partnership model has not been eliminated, the Transit Committee has identified the
commission framework as a preferred model for further exploration. 140 This preferred
alternative, governance by regional transit committee, would phase in LRT over the
longer-term and would oversee regional transit governance, and phase in management,
136
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while individual operators maintain control of service and operations. This commission
could include the entire region or a sub-set of municipalities interested in inter-municipal
transit, programs and facilities. 141 If this commission were independent of the CRB
Transit Committee, some interconnectivity with the CRB would inevitably have to exist,
since transit and land-use are interconnected and both are at the very core of the CRB’s
existence.
The regional commission model was identified as having the greatest chance of
“addressing many of the barriers to implementing the approved Inter-Municipal Transit
Network Plan”, 142 the concept is that a commission would be designed to provide the
best transit services possible, but also the best leadership with senior governments and
opportunities for secured funding. This situation would involve significant direction from
the province, as a commission model would necessitate provincial approval; the Bow
Valley Regional Transit Commission has set a precedent, and the necessary “legislative
authority [for a commission] is recognized in the Municipal Government Act”. 143 Of the
many complexities involved with setting up a new commission for regional transit in the
Alberta Capital Region, the Interim Report on Governance suggests it best to focus on
the ultimate end goal rather than stumbling through several stages, each with their own
complex options and directions. This means that ongoing provincial oversight involved
with a regional transit commission must serve to depoliticize regional planning through
an “all-in” approach, whereby all three transit operators take part in regional service, in
order to capture the benefits of avoiding boundary issues. The three transit operators
face significant risk and opportunity in this arrangement, however the latitude offered in a
commission structure means that beyond the financial aspects of this arrangement, a
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more complete support mechanism for strategic plans and long term vision for transit in
the Alberta Capital Region can be realized.
The Interim Report on governance suggests the following steps be taken to
explore a commission model: “agency engagement”, “five-year service and business
plans”, and “stakeholder engagement”. The feasibility study of inter-municipal transit that
is currently underway serves to accomplish much of the agency engagement, and is
expected to move the three municipal transit operators closer to development of five
year business and service plans. At this critical juncture, the most difficult aspects of
realizing inter-municipal transit remain centered upon the CRB’s ability to act in resource
provision and policy implementation capacities, which it currently does not have. Any
advocacy and policy development that takes place at the CRB will be largely irrelevant
unless it is backed by provincial legislation and funding. Municipal elections take place in
Alberta in the fall of 2013; given that transit has been a cause championed by many local
politicians, and a long term planning issue that is sure to face new mayors and councils,
one positive element is that this matter is securely on the regional agenda. What
remains to be seen is the extent to which Premier Redford and her government take
seriously the role for provincial oversight and guidance; Redford has been clear that her
vision for Alberta’s cities includes public transit. Redford is, however, very much about
the status quo, and has been identified in the media as a fiscal conservative on
numerous Edmonton issues. 144 With regional cooperation occurring in a more functional
manner than it has in decades, a very significant piece of the inter-municipal transit
puzzle at this point remains with the province, in the form of legislative ability for the
CRB to plan, fund, own, implement, and operate transit services and facilities, which
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needs to be established by the Province. 145
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Conclusions
It is of paramount importance that the Alberta Capital Region has a clear,
mandated implementation plan and an arrangement for managing public transit
infrastructure and service delivery. The most important considerations in regards to intermunicipal transit for the Alberta Capital Region into the future relate to the structure of
regional governance, in alignment with a realistic assessment of cost sharing and
service delivery for regional growth strategies. These strategies must strive to deliver the
best quality services and forward thinking policies for urban development in the
Edmonton Metropolitan region. Repeated messaging from politicians and citizens alike
over the past decade has underscored the need for the region to undertake regional
planning as a “deliberate social activity that seeks to attain an array of goals through an
orderly process of debate, analyses, and a set of proposals”. 146 Unfortunately, the CRB
as an agent in multilevel governance and regional planning does not have the
appropriate tools at its disposal to ensure these efforts come to fruition.
One concept to revisit and consider in matters pertaining to the CRB, transit and
land-use in the Alberta Capital Region is the general satisfaction with the status quo in
Alberta. Since this is a politically comfortable situation, it becomes difficult for a regional
body tasked with making logical planning decisions to affect change through policy
implementation. In terms of inter-municipal transit in the Alberta Capital Region, any
tangible result will undoubtedly involve a legislation enabling the CRB to implement
change directly or to work alongside a regional transit commission. Past unwillingness to
change the awkward dynamics of the Alberta Capital Region has led to a sphere of
distrust between local agents; given the present climate of local cooperation and
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potential willingness to approach inter-municipal transit as a serious topic, a mechanism
for breaking this cyclical partiality to the status quo must be found.
Harris’ review of transit as a public good, and the importance of delivering transit
as a public service, has been particularly insightful. His work highlights the importance of
understanding public transit’s role in direct, perpetual competition with the automobile, 147
the impacts of this relationship and their pertinence to public administrators. Harris also
serves to reiterate the linkage between land use and transportation, and encompasses
this relation in a cyclical relationship whereby land use influences citizens’ trips, thus
determining their transportation needs and shaping the urban landscape based on
transportation facilities, which influences accessibility and affects land value. 148 The
most effective way to raise revenue and ridership (most especially discretionary
commuter ridership) is to improve an individual’s transit experience; in the case of
Edmonton, this could be achieved through a transit system that truly reflects the region’s
travel needs and more effectively addresses land-use, population growth and travel
patterns.
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Appendix A: List of Interviews & Contacts

Key contacts and interviews for the purposes of this report included:
•

Don Iveson, Edmonton City Councillor
o

•

Peter Wlodarczak, Strathcona County Councillor
o

•

Chair, Bow Valley Regional Transit Commission

Ettore Iannacito, Regional Transit Program Manager
o

•

Capital Region Board (via e-mail)

Leslie Taylor, Banff Town Councillor
o

•

Member, Capital Region Board Transit Committee

Sharon Shuya, Manager of Regional Projects
o

•

Member, Capital Region Board Transit Committee

Len Bracko, St. Albert City Councillor
o

•

Chair, Capital Region Board Transit Committee

Calgary Regional Partnership

David Cooper, Senior Transit Planner
o

Calgary Transit
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